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FACTS
In 1994, Juan Anibal Aguirre-Aguirre ("Aguirre") appeared before an
immigration judge in Las Vegas, Nevada, to plead for asylum and for
withholding of deportation.' Aguirre sought political asylum and withholding
of deportation because he believed that he would be murdered or seriously
injured if he returned to his native Guatemala.2
Aguirre was a member of a politically active student group called
Estudeante Syndicado ("ES") 3 from 1988 until he fled Guatemala in 1992. ES
sought to effect change in Guatemala through protest, which often involved
violent activities.4 ES and Aguirre protested against the government's increase
of their bus fares and possible complicity in the disappearance of student
leaders. 5 In order to make the Guatemalan government take notice of its
opposition to bus fare increases, ES began a campaign of systematic
interruption of the bus system and intimidation of its passengers.6 To manifest
further student dissatisfaction with government treatment, action was also
taken against store owners.7
The tactics that ES employed involved the seizing buses full of
passengers. s ES would force the passengers from the bus.9 Passengers who
resisted ES's seizure of the bus were physically assaulted.'0 Members of ES
would strike recalcitrant passengers with sticks, or bind them and physically
remove them if they stayed." Once emptied, ES members doused the buses
with gasoline and set them on fire.' 2  Aguirre participated in ten such
incidents. 13
1. Brief for Respondent at 1, I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S. Ct. 1439 (1999) (No. 97-1754).
2. Id.
3. 119 S. Ct. at 1443.
4. Aguirre-Aguirre v. I.N.S., 121 F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 1997).
5. Aguirre-Aguirre v. LN.S., 121 F.3d at 522. Bus fares were a major source of aggravation for
Guatemalans. The Guatemalan government controlled the nationalized bus system and would arbitrarily
raise and lower fares. As the bus system is the only means of transportation for the vast majority of the
Guatemalan population, which lives in poverty, thus any increase in price met with disapproval.
6. LN.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S. Ct. at 1444.
7. Aguirre-Aguirre v. I.N.S., 121 F.3d at 525 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) Summarizing Aguirre's
testimony in support his asylum petition, in which he detailed his involvement in the destruction of the
personal property of many store owners and other Guatemalans.
8. 121 F.3d at 525 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
9. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
10. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
11. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
12. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 522.
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Aguirre and ES also attracted the attention of the government by
disrupting the local economy in various areas.' 4 In a manner similar to their
attacks on the national bus system, ES members entered, occupied and
destroyed stores."5 They advised the patrons to leave, and if they chose not to,
ES members would forcibly eject them from the store.'6 This was
accomplished by beating those who refused to leave the premises with sticks. 7
When the patrons were outside of the store ES members stoned them to make
them disperse.'8 Once the store was emptied, ES members routinely took
items contained therein.' 9 All other items were thrown to the floor, doused
with gasoline and bumed. 20 Aguirre participated in several such attacks on
stores.2'
ES attracted the attention of the Guatemalan government.22  The
government appealed to ES on television to halt its protests.23 Later, Aguirre
and other members of ES received threats from the Guatemalan military.2
Aguirre stated that he received correspondence on official government
stationary warning him "to be a good citizen." 25 ES's actions also earned them
the enmity of Guatemalan rebel groups.26 Rebel groups viewed members of
ES as sympathetic to the military.27 Guatemalan students, such as Aguirre,
were required to fulfill some level of mandatory military service, the
connection to the military made them targets of rebel groups.' The rebel
groups, characterized by Aguirre as left-wing guerrillas, made threats against
Aguirre and other members of ES. 29 These threats were not idle. Five
members of ES were found dead in the six months prior to Aguirre's flight
from Guatemala.30 As it was unknown whether these murders were committed
by the military or guerrillas, Aguirre's situation in Guatemala was even more
precarious. 3'
14. 119 S. Ct. at 1444.
15. Id.
16. id.
17. 121 F.3d at 525 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
18. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
19. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
20. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
21. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
22. 121 F.3d at 524.
23. Id.
24. Brief for Respondent at 3, I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S. Ct. 1439 (1999) (No. 97-1754).
25. Id.
26. 121 F.3d at 524.
27. Brief for Respondent at 4, I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 119 S. Ct. 1439 (1999) (No. 97-1754).
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 6.
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The Immigration Judge ("U"), whom Aguirre appeared before, found his
testimony credible and granted both withholding and asylum on the basis that
Aguirre would be persecuted for his political beliefs if he were returned to
Guatemala.3 2 The Immigration and Nationalization Service ("INS") appealed
this ruling to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). 33 In an unpublished
decision, the BIA reviewed the facts of the case and overturned the ruling of
the U. According to the BIA, Aguirre's actions were non-political, leaving
him ineligible for asylum or withholding of deportation.' Under section 1253
of Title 8 of the United States Code, withholding is not available to an alien
who has committed a serious non-political crime before entering this country. 5
Thus, under the statutory regime, the BIA ruled that the "nature of his acts
against innocent Guatemalans' made him unworthy of a favorable exercise of
discretion ....*- Because the BIA considered Aguirre's actions more
criminal than political, he was barred from withholding of deportation."
In 1997, Aguirre appealed this ruling to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which eventually reversed the BIA's decision.3' The appellate court
found that the BIA erred as a matter of law on three points. 39 First, the BIA
did not examine the crimes committed by Aguirre with respect to his stated
political goals.' Second, the BIA did not consider the precedent in the
circuit.4' Third, the BIA failed to consider "the persecution that Aguirre might
suffer if [he] returned to Guatemala.,
42
The appellate court pointed out that it had previously considered the non-
political crime exception in McMullen v. Immigration and Nationalization
Service.43 In McMullen, the appellate court stated that Congress "intended the
nonpolitical crimes exception to withholding of deportation to be consistent
with the Convention [Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150
(1951)] and Protocol [Relating to Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 622[4]
32. 119 S. Ct. at 1444.
33. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(I) (1998). Pursuant to federal regulations, the BIA is vested with the authority
to make this determination on behalf of the attorney general. Thus, the BIA has the derivative power to
deny withholding if "there are serious reasons for considering that an alien has committed a non-political
crime outside the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States."
34. 121 F.3d at 522.
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C) (1994). Withholding of deportation is mandatory unless an alien
establishes that he or she would be in grave peril if returned to their native country. This is not available
if "there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside
the United States prior the arrival of the alien in the United States."
36. 121 F.3d at 522.
37. Id. at 522-23.
38. Id. at 522.
39. 119 S. Ct. at 1444.
40. 121 F.3d at 524.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1992).
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(1968)]."44 The relevant statutory provision was altered by the Refugee Act
of 1980 4' to comport with "the principles agreed to in the 1967 United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 46 to which the United States
acceded to in 1968." 47 The appellate court found that the concerns of
McMullen also applied in this case. 4' According to the appellate court,
Congress intended an examination of the term "refugee" as defined by Article
I of the Convention and Protocol.49 The Protocol definition excludes any
person from refugee status who "has committed a serious non-political crime
outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a
refugee. ' 50 Thus, the appellate court applied U.N. protocol to Aguirre's
appeal.
Under this analysis, the appellate court reasoned that the BIA did not
consider the crimes that Aguirre committed in Guatemala "in relation to [his]
declared political objectives. According to the appellate court, 8 U.S.C. §
1253(h) must be applied consistently with the McMullen decision and the U.N.
Protocol.52  Through this application, the appellate court reasoned that
Aguirre's actions were not taken for personal gain, as he acted to protest
conditions in his native Guatemala.53 The appellate court declared that there
was a "close and direct causal link between the crimes committed and [their]
alleged political purpose and object." ' Thus, the appellate court reasoned that
Aguirre, because of the political nature of his actions, was still within the
definition of refugee used by both the U.N. and Congress.55
In scrutinizing the BIA's second error, the appellate court stated that the
BIA should have made the determination as to whether "the crimes committed
were grossly out of proportion to the alleged objective,"56 and whether the
44. 121 F.3d at 524.
45. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. (1980).
46. United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224.
47. 119 S. Ct. at 1446.






54. United Nations, High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status, Para. 152, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev. I [hereinafter Handbook]. "In
determining whether an offence is 'non-political' or is, on the contrary, a 'political' crime, regard should
be given in the first place to its nature and purpose i.e. whether it has been committed out of genuine
political motives and not merely for personal reasons or gain. There should also be a close and direct causal
link between the crime committed and its alleged political purpose and object. The political element of the
offence should also outweigh its common-law character. This would not be the case if the acts committed
are grossly out of proportion to the alleged objective. The political nature of the offense is also more difficult
to accept if it involves acts of an atrocious nature." Id.
55. 121 F.3d at 523.
56. Handbook, supra note 54, at Para. 152.
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actions were "atrocious in nature."57 The appellate court stated that the
McMullen decision "cast[s] light on what under the law are acts of atrocious
nature."5" As the BIA did not use McMullen as its guideline to determine what
type of action was "atrocious," the appellate court declared that the BIA did
not follow precedent within the circuit.
59
According to the appellate court, the BIA also erred in not considering the
potential danger that awaited Aguirre if returned to Guatemala. 60 Again, the
Court of Appeals looked to the U.N. Protocol for authority. 61 "If a person has
well-founded fear of very severe persecution, e.g. persecution endangering his
life or freedom, a crime must be very grave in order to exclude him. ' 62 The
appellate court determined from Aguirre's testimony that while still in
Guatemala he and other student leaders received death threats sufficient to
satisfy the future harm requirement.63 The appellate court also found that the
BIA did not attempt to balance the danger inherent in Aguirre's return to
Guatemala with the nature of his admitted offenses.
64
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a unanimous decision,
reversed the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 5 The Court stated that the BIA has an affirmative duty to give
meaning to ambiguous statutory terms "through a process of case-by-case
adjudication. '" In addition, the Court determined that the appellate court
should have examined whether "the agency's [ruling was] based on a
permissible construction of the statute" in question.67 In light of what the
57. Id.
58. 121 F.3d at 524. The court of appeals found that McMullen's crimes, which included
indiscriminate bombing, murder, torture and maiming of innocent civilians in conjunction with the
Provisional Irish Republican Army, were not comparable to the crimes alleged against Aguirre. Because
of the great difference in the crimes, the court of appeals believed that Aguirre was not deserving of the




62. Handbook, supra note 54, at Para. 156.
63. 121 F.3d at 524.
64. Id.
65. 119 S. Ct. at 1442.
66. Id. at 1445 (quoting I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,448-49 (1987)).
67. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)
(stating that upon judicial review of agency's construction of statute it administers, relevant inquiry for court
is whether agency's construction was permissible). See also I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448-49.
2000]
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Court perceived to be the BIA's correct interpretation of § 1253(h) and the
principles set forth in Chevron, the Court reversed the appellate court and
remanded the case.6"
ANALYSIS
In reversing and remanding the decision of the appellate court, the
Supreme Court stated that the BIA, not the appellate court, is the final arbiter
regarding the interpretation of statutes that it administers. 69 According to the
Court, deference must be given to the BIA's interpretation of the relevant
statute due to the inability of the judiciary to make determinations that may
affect foreign relations.70 The "judiciary is not well positioned to shoulder
primary responsibility for assessing the likelihood and importance of such
diplomatic repercussions."'" Deference is "especially appropriate in the
immigration context where officials 'exercise especially sensitive political
functions that implicate questions of foreign relations."'72
The Court found that the appellate court erred in interpreting the relevant
statute itself, rather than deferring to the interpretation of the BIA.73 In its
interpretation of § 1253(h), the appellate court stated that the BIA must
balance Aguirre's criminal acts against the possibility of persecution in
Guatemala.74 The Court also stated that the analysis of the appellate court was
flawed in its determination that the McMullen decision controlled as to
whether Aguirre's crime was in fact atrocious. 75 Finally, the Court found that
the appellate court erred in weighing heavily the necessity and success of
Aguirre's actions.
76
As the appellate court noted, the outcome of this case depended, in a most
basic sense, on the interpretation given to one statute. 7 Pursuant to this
statute, the BIA determined that Aguirre's actions rose to the level of a serious
nonpolitical crime. The BIA employed its interpretation of the statute to
evaluate Aguirre's actions.78
68. 119 S. Ct. at 1449.
69. Id. at 1445
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (quoting I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1998)).




77. 121 F.3d at 523.
78. Id. at 524.
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In evaluating the political nature of a crime, we consider it important that
the political aspect of the offense outweigh its common-law character. This
would not be the case if the crime is grossly out of proportion to the political
objective or if it involves acts of an atrocious nature. 9
The BIA found "the criminal nature of the respondent's acts outweigh
their political nature."'  According to the BIA, destruction of property and
violence against civilians were not political, despite the fact Aguirre and ES
had political goals."'
Although overturned by the appellate court for failing to consider other
factors in its determination, the Supreme Court found the BIA analysis to be
within the constraints of the statutory structure set forth by Congress.82
Consequently, the Court reversed the decision of appellate court.83
The Court specifically rejected the appellate court's balancing of Aguirre' s
criminal acts against the possibility of persecution if he returned to
Guatemala." The BIA had previously rejected any interpretation of the phrase
"serious nonpolitical crime" in 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C).8 5 The Supreme Court
found the BIA's reading of the statute more convincing than that of the
appellate court, as the plain language of the statute does not suggest the need
to examine the possibility of persecution in the event that the applicant is
returned to his country.86
The Court stated that the appellate court relied too heavily on the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status ("U.N. Handbook"). 7 The appellate
court went beyond § 1253, into which Congress incorporated many elements
of Article 33 of the U.N. Handbook, and applied Paragraph 156 of the U.N.
Handbook, which had not been so incorporated.88 Paragraph 156 stresses the
importance of "strik[ing] a balance between the nature of the offense presumed
to have been committed by the applicant and the degree of persecution feared"
by the applicant if deported.89 In discussing the handbook, the Court stated
79. Matter of McMullen, 19 1. & N. Dec. 90,97-98 (BIA 1984).
80. 119 S. Ct. at 1444.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1445.
84. Id. at 1446.
85. Matter of Rodriguez-Coto, 19 1. & N. Dec. 208, 210 (1985).
86. 119 S. Ct. at 1445.
87. Id. at 1447.
88. Id. at 1446.
89. Handbook, supra note 54, at Para. 156.
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that the U.N. Handbook "is a useful interpretive aid, but is not binding on the
Attorney General, the BIA or United States courts.""
The Supreme Court also found that the appellate court relied too heavily
on U.N. protocol when determining that the crimes committed by Aguirre
were not atrocious in nature and were proportionate to his desired ends.9' The
Court pointed out that the appellate court referred to Paragraph 152 of the U.N.
Handbook when it stated that the BIA should have considered if the acts
committed were "grossly out of proportion to the alleged objective., 92 In
addition, the Supreme Court found it troubling that the appellate court used
McMullen to determine whether an act was "atrocious. '93 The Supreme Court
concurred with the BIA that a non-atrocious act could also be a serious
nonpolitical crime, and thus, sufficient enough to make an actor ineligible for
withholding." "If atrocious acts were deemed a necessary element of all
serious nonpolitical crimes, the Attorney General would have severe
restrictions upon her power to deport aliens who had engaged in serious,
though not atrocious, forms of criminal activity."95
The Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's finding that the BIA
failed to consider Aguirre's "offenses in relation to [his] declared political
objectives." The BIA initially held that there was not a satisfactory link
between Aguirre's activities in Guatemala and his alleged political
objectives.97 Thus, Aguirre had the burden of showing that a causal link
between the action and the objective existed.9" Because he failed to submit a
brief to the BIA on this issue, the Court held that the analysis and decision of
the BIA did not warrant reversal. 99
CONCLUSION
Under the Court's analysis, the BIA has the final word on the immigration
statutes that it administers, and its decisions appear to be outside the scope of
judicial review. Such a development places a great deal of power in the BIA,
as a reviewing court does not have the authority to undertake a complete a de
novo review of such a case. Thus, the reviewing court is presented with only





95. ld. at 1448.
96. Id.





the opportunity to review the agency's interpretation of the relevant statute.
If that interpretation is not rational, the court can then overturn the agency's
decision, but if it is rational, the court must affirm the decision. Under this
ruling, it is not within the purview of the reviewing court to rule on the
appropriateness or quality of the agency's decision, but only to examine
whether the ruling was rational and consistent with other agency decisions.
Without plenary power to review a case, the position of the reviewing court is
weakened. The reviewing court has no choice but to re-interpret the relevant
statute if the court believes that the BIA has misinterpreted the statute or has
improperly performed its role of fact-finder. Under this scheme, the reviewing
court cannot make statutory interpretations, as only the agency has the
authority to interpret the relevant statute.
This decision grants unfettered discretion to the BIA in interpreting the
statutes it administers. The Court, citing statutory construction and prudential
considerations, has narrowly circumscribed the power of reviewing courts and
expanded the role of government agency adjudication. As in Chevron, the
Court has transferred a great deal of power to the BIA. With this ruling, the
Supreme Court has removed all but the most minimal judicial oversight from
the executive agency charged with administering immigration statutes.
Although it is unclear to what affect this will have on immigration and
immigrants, it is possible that the executive branch could use this newfound
discretion to regulate or allow only selective immigration to this country. Or,
perhaps this ruling will serve to chill political reform in countries that are
oppressive to their citizenry. The United States has always been a beacon and
a refuge for those who have been oppressed and for political dissidents. This
new regime could change that label.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Stephen G. DeLisle
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